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SUSPICION AND THE PROTECTION OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT VALUES
FabioArcila, Jr.t
Suspicion is perhaps the core foundational principle through which we
Fourth
seek to protect and vindicate Fourth Amendment values.
Amendment law could not be clearer, and repeats over and over again, that
it proceeds from a presumptive suspicion requirement.' We are all so
familiar with that proposition that we can easily incant it: a governmental
search is presumptively unconstitutional unless supported by some
threshold of prior suspicion.2 Though suspicion is thus a hallmark of
Fourth Amendment black letter law, I come to critique it. I critique it
because the presumptive suspicion requirement's provenance is historically
questionable, both as a matter of the common law and in light of federal
statutory search law during the Framers' era. Even apart from the historical
case, I critique it because it is demonstrably wrong in terms of
contemporary constitutionalism. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is not
honest about suspicion's role in protecting Fourth Amendment values, and
our failure to look critically at suspicion has prevented us from doing a
better job of protecting those values. It can no longer do the heavy lifting
we have asked it to do, and it is time to look elsewhere to develop
alternative methods for protecting Fourth Amendment interests.
Suspicion worked well in the Framers' world, but that is a world very
different from our own.3 The Framers lived in a largely rural, agrarian
4
world with a limited federal government and a limited administrative state.
Governmental search power existed under the common law for stolen
goods,5 and under statutory law to enforce revenue statutes, primarily
customs dutieS6 and, to a lesser extent excise taxes.' Requirements of
t Associate Professor, Touro Law Center. Many thanks to Professor Arnold Loewy for the
opportunity to present at the 4th Annual Texas Tech Criminal Law Symposium, which was dedicated to
the Fourth Amendment.
1. E.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305, 308, 313 (1997).
2. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37; Miller, 520 U.S. at 313.
3. Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1275, 1326-35 (2010)
[hereinafter Arcila, Death ofSuspicion].
4. Id. at 1327-28, 1331-32.
5. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 645
(1999) [hereinafter Davies, OriginalFourthAmendment].
6. E.g., 1799 Collection Act, Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 68, 1 Stat. 627, 677-78; 1790
Collection Act, Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 48, 1 Stat. 145, 170; 1789 Collection Act, Act of July 31,
1789, ch. 5, §24, 1 Stat. 29, 43.
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suspicion and probable cause were hallmarks of the common-law model
and often requirements under revenue statutes.
This background has led to our adoption of a presumptive suspicion
requirement. But that requirement is of questionable validity under this
historical record because it does not cover the totality of our experience.
Even under the common law there are abundant reasons to question the
protective role that suspicion really played. For example, there are many
reasons to believe that prior suspicion often may not have been enforced ex
ante through judicial sentryship prior to issuing search warrants.9 And there
are many reasons to question the efficacy of having enforced prior
suspicion ex post,'o either through a jury verdict in a common-law trespass
action" or through judicial fiat in most civil search cases.12 Changes in
language also provide reason for questioning suspicion's effectiveness in
protecting Fourth Amendment values. Probable cause was an important
search concept to the Framers, but clearly it was also an immature concept
that could be satisfied under terms that would never be accepted today, such
as living an idle or vagrant life or merely being a nightwalker."
Importantly, even if I am mistaken in my historical analysis, my
critique of the presumptive suspicion requirement remains valid as a matter
of contemporary constitutionalism. This is because suspicion has been
under assault for decades, and we have now reached a point when it no
longer works and is demonstrably wrong.14
Three developments have been putting pressure on the presumptive
suspicion requirement: the move away from a rural, agrarian life to an
urban life infused with rapidly evolving technology, especially in the
surveillance sphere;" the rise of the regulatory state;' 6 and post-9/ 11
security concerns.1 Each of these developments has created both pressures
and increased opportunities for preventative searches, many, if not most, of
which cannot satisfy a prior suspicion requirement.

7. E.g., Hamilton's 1791 Excise Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, §§ 29, 32, 1 Stat. 199, 206, 207.
8. See Arcila, DeathofSuspicion, supranote 3, at 1289 n.30, 1297, 1303 & n.92.
9. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the MisunderstoodCommon-Law History of
Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 24-54 (2007) [hereinafter Arcila, In the
Trenches].
10. See Arcila, Death ofSuspicion, supra note 3, at 1313.
I1. Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Framers' Search Power: The Misunderstood Statutory History of
Suspicion & Probable Cause, 50 B.C. L. REv. 363, 371, 376-78 (2009) [hereinafter Arcila, The
Framers'SearchPower].
12. Id. at 392-413.
13. Arcila, Death ofSuspicion, supra note 3, at 1314.
14. Id. at 1326-35.
15. Id. at 1327-31.
16. Id. at 1331-34.
17. Id. at 1334-35.
18. See id. at 1327-35.
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Our lack of recognition of this changed paradigm goes a long way to
explaining the widespread dissatisfaction with the state of Fourth
Amendment law today. On the criminal side, the move toward an urban
existence led to the establishment of a professionalized police force to
protect the public, which, as Professor Davies has shown, resulted in a
desire to expand their discretion.19 This expanded discretion has not
happily coexisted with a presumptive suspicion requirement, leading to a
situation in which the reality is that the vast majority of criminal searches
are suspicionless, yet are justified on other grounds, such as because they
are plain view searches, 20 consent searches, 21 or simply (and outrageously)
declared not to be searches at all though the dynamic is one in which the
government was purposefully snooping for evidence of criminal conduct.22
Even on the criminal side, where the presumptive suspicion requirement is
most stringently applied, it is much more accurate to say that a small
minority of criminal searches must be supported by some threshold of prior
suspicion than to say that a search is presumptively unconstitutional unless
supported by a threshold of prior suspicion.
On the civil side, though our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
continues to mouth the presumptive suspicion requirement,23 it cannot do so
with any credibility given the various doctrines that avoid it, from the
special needs principle 24 to a generalized reasonableness approach, 25 all of
which lead to the application of an unconstrained balancing test.2 6 We
arrived at a balancing test because of the need to allow flexibility in a

19. Id. at 1326-27 & n.212.
20. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 n.4 (1983).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (holding that police may rely upon
consent to search on bus without advising about right to non-cooperation); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177, 186-89 (1990) (ruling that police may rely upon apparent authority to grant consent). The
desire to allow police discretion was certainly a motivating factor in the Supreme Court's ruling that
consent needs to be voluntary, but not knowing. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
22. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005) (concluding that a police dog sniff during
traffic stop is not a search); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1984) (ruling that a DEA
field test of powder found in damaged Federal Express package was not a search); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (declaring that a DEA dog sniff of seized luggage at airport is not a
search).
23. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (discussing special
needs); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 320, 340 (1985).
24. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 829 (2002); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989).
25. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009); Mich.
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990).
26. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-50 (generalized reasonableness case); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20
(special needs case); see also Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately
Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1178-84,
1187-1207 (1988) (explaining that the Supreme Court is increasingly applying the balancing test, and
critiquing that test); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
ConstitutionalTheory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 44-50 (1988) (discussing Fourth Amendment balancing).
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jurisprudence that has to grapple with constitutional challenges in contexts
as varied as restaurant health inspections, student searches in public
schools, and warrantless wiretapping-in other words, in myriad
administrative contexts and on pressing national security concerns.2 7 I
light of this need for flexibility, demanding adherence to a presumptive
suspicion requirement is unrealistic. Many, if not most, of these sorts of
civil searches could not occur if a prior suspicion requirement applied, and
thus the relevant administrative or security goals could not be achieved
either, no matter how laudable or important.
The good news is that reducing our reliance on suspicion can actually
help us do a better job in protecting Fourth Amendment values. This is
because, though suspicion is very useful in protecting certain Fourth
Amendment values, it does not adequately protect all of them. Take, for
instance, the Fourth Amendment values of limiting governmental
discretion, protecting privacy and dignitary interests, minimizing
intrusiveness, and assuring a compelling and legitimate governmental need
for a search. Suspicion works nicely to limit governmental discretion by
forcing the government to articulate why it should be allowed to search.
Suspicion is also useful in protecting privacy, though its usefulness here is
more limited given the many aspects of privacy that the Fourth Amendment
protects. A good example is dignitary interests. Part of what makes
privacy important to us is that it can protect our dignitary interests.
Suspicion can often protect privacy, and when it does so, it can protect
dignitary interests as well. But, it does not protect all the privacy and
dignitary interests that are important to us.
Consider, for example, the hypothetical of a strip search of an
elementary school student for an aspirin, to enforce the school's zerotolerance policy for drugs (which includes over-the-counter drugs, as is
common and was recently exemplified in Safford Unified School District
No. 1 v. Redding).2 8 No matter how adequate the suspicion, the Fourth
Amendment should condemn such a search because suspicion does not
protect all of the Fourth Amendment values that are important. In this
hypothetical, the presence of suspicion did not adequately protect the
child's privacy and did nothing to protect her dignitary interests. Suspicion
also did very little, if anything, to minimize the intrusiveness of the search
or assure a compelling and legitimate governmental need. Rather, some
concept other than suspicion would have to be applied to more directly and
adequately protect those values.

27. See Arcila, Death ofSuspicion, supranote 3, at 1329-35.
28. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639-40 (2009) ("In this
case, the school's policies strictly prohibit the nonmedical use, possession, or sale of any drug on school
grounds, including any prescription or over-the-counter drug, except those for which permission to use
in school has been granted pursuant to Board policy.") (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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Though I critique suspicion, I should be clear that I am not calling for
its abandonment. To the contrary, I believe suspicion must continue to play
an important role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.2 9 My point is only
that the role suspicion can effectively play in search and seizure law is not
commensurate with its rhetorical role in that jurisprudence. Suspicion will
continue to be an important means of protecting Fourth Amendment values
in certain types of cases, primarily in certain types of criminal searches.
But protected Fourth Amendment values are at stake in many other
contexts, not just other types of criminal searches, but also in all civil
searches, and in these other contexts suspicion will have a limited
protective role.
Thus, decreasing our reliance on suspicion could have the salutary
effect of broadening our thinking, both about the various Fourth
Amendment values we seek to protect and about how to protect them.
One suggestion I have made elsewhere is to emphasize a structural
approach to the Fourth Amendment, by which I mean revising our Fourth
Amendment black letter law to accentuate a system of checks and balances
through the separation of powers.o We could accomplish this by favoring
governmental searches that are subject to oversight by another
governmental branch, preferably through judicial-rather than merely
legislative-oversight.'
Other ideas I have proposed are to more directly and explicitly
embrace concepts that limit governmental discretion, such as adopting a
proportionality principle throughout all Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.32
Such a proportionality principle would be extremely useful in the public
school strip search hypothetical. Another option is to limit consent to
instances in which it is not only voluntary, but also knowing, which would
require overruling Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.33
These reforms hold the potential for being a powerful means of
limiting governmental search discretion, a key Fourth Amendment value,
but one that Supreme Court case law is increasingly subverting. On the
criminal side, cases like Whren v. United States, a traffic stop case, and
Illinois v. Caballes, a dog sniff case, defer to executive discretion in
implementing the search power.34 On the civil side, deferential judicial
review is rampant, such as in Michigan v. Sitz, the sobriety checkpoint case,
or in the special needs school drug-testing cases such as Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of Independent School
29. See Arcila, Death of Suspicion, supra note 3, at 1339 (suggesting a suspicion guideline that
more accurately reflects the concept's proper role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence compared to the
presumptive suspicion requirement).
30. See id. at 1336-37.
31. See id.
at1337-39.
32. See id. at 1339-40.
33. See id. at 1340 (critiquing Schneck v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)).
34. See Illinois v. Caballas, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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DistrictNo. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls.35 This judicial tendency
towards extending deference in search cases has been noted in prior
scholarship, both my own 36 and of colleagues, 37 and represents perhaps the
most pernicious threat to Fourth Amendment values. In these sorts of cases
the Supreme Court majority is reluctant to engage in aggressive judicial
review, preferring to extend the soft glove of deferential review, sometimes
out of misguided respect for the search authority's expertise or ostensibly
out of judicial restraint in favor of an essentially majoritarian Fourth
Amendment.
But Fourth Amendment law is not administrative law, nor should it be.
Neither the history supporting our adoption of the Fourth Amendment, nor
the dynamics of each jurisprudence, supports extending into Fourth
Amendment law the sort of deferential review that is the hallmark of
administrative law.
The agency expertise that helps justify deferential
review to agency action does not exist in any comparable way in the Fourth
Amendment context.39 On the civil side, the agencies or quasi-agencies,
such as public schools, that conduct governmental searches may have
expertise of some sort, such as enforcing sanitary standards or assuring
workplace safety or educating students, but that does not translate into
expertise about the appropriate scope and constraints on governmental
search authority.40 On the criminal side, the expertise justification fares
better after the establishment of a professionalized police force, but does
not, either by itself or in conjunction with a majoritarian rationale, justify
deferential review in light of the Fourth Amendment's history and purposes.
Fourth Amendment history is marked by hostility to executive
discretion amongst the populace, the courts, or both, such as was aimed at
writs of assistance in the colonieS41 or against general warrants in the Wilkes
cases from Great Britain.4 2 And the Fourth Amendment itself is as antimajoritarian as any other Bill of Rights provision,4 3 if not more so, with its
clear limitations on, and presupposition of an autonomous zone against,

35. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vemonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Action, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
36. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs & Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil Searches in the
Modern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1223, 1247-52 (2004) [hereinafter Arcila, SpecialNeeds].
37. Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
2010).
38. See Arcila, Special Needs, supra note 36, at 1253-59.
39. See id. at 1253-57.
40. See id. at 1247-49, 1253-57 (exploring separation of powers dimension of Fourth Amendment
cases, in which the judiciary often extends deferential review consistent with a majoritarian approach,
premised in part upon agency expertise).
41. See Arcila, In the Trenches, supra note 9, at 10-12.
42. See id., at 14-15 n.41.
43. See Arcila, Special Needs, supra note 36, at 1260-61 (discussing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305 (1997), as exemplifying a Supreme Court reluctance to interpret the Fourth Amendment along
wholly majoritarian lines).
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executive search authority." This is not to deny that a deferential or
majoritarian Fourth Amendment jurisprudence could be developed, or that a
coherent theory could be articulated to justify it, but only to emphasize that
to follow such a path would require a breathtaking departure from Fourth
Amendment history and the Framers' intent in adopting it. 45
Certainly, devoting resources to considering the values that the Fourth
Amendment protects is a valuable endeavor, but I doubt that discussion can
be meaningfully separated from the interpretative means by which the
Fourth Amendment protects those values. To date, our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has continued to insist that suspicion is a primary means of
protecting those values. But the time has come to look for alternatives to
suspicion in order to assure that Fourth Amendment values continue to be
adequately protected.

44. Arcila, In the Trenches, supra note 9, at 3 n.5 (noting that, during their confirmation hearings
for a seat on the Supreme Court, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, though "superheroes to
the conservative movement," cited the Fourth Amendment "as one constitutional provision evincing an
individual privacy right").
45. See Arcila, Special Needs, supranote 36, at 1255-56.

